Contrary to popular opinion, we find evidence that the views of residents of both higher and lower income neighborhoods are represented by their legislators. Analyzing the voting behavior of California state legislators on 77 proposals on which both the legislature and the public cast ballots, we find first that the opinions of higher and lower income voters within a district are highly correlated and thus it is impossible to represent the views of one group and not also represent the views of the other. And to the question of whether one income group is better represented than the other, our descriptive analysis suggests that the answer depends on representative party. Republican legislators vote more along the lines of the views of their constituents residing in high income neighborhoods. Democratic legislative voting is better predicted by the voters of lower income areas. These party/income group patterns hold within legislator, for taxation-the key issue that puts high and low income voters at odds, and for those votes for which there is more at stake for the elected official. The fact that lower income voters are more likely to be registered Democrats and higher income voters to be registered Republicans does not explain away our findings. However, the fact that lower income voters are more likely to espouse Democratic views (and similarly high income voters, Republican views) does. Democratic and Republican legislators represent voters at opposite ends of the income distribution because they represent voters at opposite ends of the ideology distribution.
"You see, the rich are different from you and me: they have more influence. It's partly a matter of campaign contributions, but it's also a matter of social pressure, since politicians spend a lot of time hanging out with the wealthy. So when the rich face the prospect of paying an extra 3 or 4 percent of their income in taxes, politicians feel their pain -feel it much more acutely, it's clear, than they feel the pain of families who are losing their jobs, their houses, and their hopes."
--Paul Krugman (2010) Do politicians better represent the interests of their higher income constituents? Perhaps because of the increasing costs of campaigns, or the greater participation of high income citizens in the political process or because politicians more often hail from the higher classes themselves, popular belief seems to be that the answer is yes. And in fact the idea that United States political institutions are less responsive to the needs of the poor has been postulated as a mechanism for the lower level of redistribution in the US compared to other developed countries. (See for example Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, and Persson and Tabellini, 2003) . In this paper we present empirical evidence on whether less income means less representation.
Previous research has provided suggestive answers to the question. Druckman and Jacobs (2011) show that the positions that President Reagan espoused in his speeches on Social Security better match the views of high income than of low income Americans. Erickson and Bhatti (2011) , revisit an analysis by Bartels (2008) to address weighting and sample size limitations.
The authors regress the DW Nominate score, a summary measure of the liberal/conservative leaning of a United States senator's voting record for a congressional session, on the mean liberal/conservative leaning of lower, middle and upper income National Annenberg Election Survey respondents in the senator's state. While in most specifications the authors find that the liberalness of upper income voters enters with a larger coefficient than that of lower income voters, the difference is not statistically significant. The authors conclude there is little evidence that higher income constituents are better represented than lower income constituents. 1 One reason that Erickson and Bhatti (2010) fail to reject their null of no income difference may be their lack of vote variation. Because of the lack of data on public opinion by state and income on each senatorial vote cast, the variety of votes cast by a senator in a session is collapsed to a single liberal/conservative score. Although the authors focus on three congressional sessions they have no cross time variation in the independent variable because they pool the 2000 and 2004
Annenberg surveys to increase sample size within state/income cells. Thus the authors must rely on a single cross section of explanatory data.
We overcome this data limitation by turning to the state of California. Because of the state's extensive use of ballot initiatives we are able to identify 77 times over the years [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] during which the state legislators and the public voted on the same proposal. We use these data to ask whether residents of higher or lower income areas are better represented, and whether the answer varies by issue or vote importance.
Individuals are represented by their legislators to the degree that those legislators behave (e.g., vote in congress) the way the individual would behave if that individual went to the legislature to represent him/herself. Therefore an individual may be well represented without having a causal impact on the voting behavior of the legislator. The legislator may vote as the constituent wishes because of a shared background or shared partisanship, for example. Thus, in order to understand whether lower or higher income voters are better represented, we examine simple correlations between the propensity of constituents in lower and higher income neighborhoods to vote liberally on an issue and their legislators' propensity to do the same.
We find first that opinions across income groups are highly correlated so that even if a legislator aims to vote according to the views of high income voters, for the most part s/he will track the views of low income voters as well. We then run conditional correlations, namely linear probability models of a legislator's roll call vote on a particular issue on the average views of lower and higher income voters on the same issue to understand whether the lower or higher income voters are better represented. The answer depends on legislator party. Following conventional wisdom, Republican voting behavior is significantly better explained by the views of residents of higher income areas. For Democratic legislators the patterned is reversed: their voting behavior better tracks the views of constituents from lower income parts of their district.
For both parties the pattern holds for taxation, an issue that puts higher and lower income voters at odds. And for legislators of both parties we see the result is robust to times when, because of electoral pressures or the closeness of the vote, there is more at stake for the individual legislator.
Finally, turning to a national survey we present limited evidence that our results are robust to moving away from the high income, high referenda use context of the state of California.
Why do Republican legislators vote more like their higher income constituents and Democratic legislators more like constituents from lower income areas? We return to our richer California data to explore several possible mechanisms. We rule out greater alignment between legislators' personal opinions and the opinions of the wealthy (less wealthy) as our results are robust to legislator fixed effects. We further rule out constituent participation differences. In both Republican and Democratic districts political participation is increasing in income. We additionally rule out the greater propensity of high (low) income voters to belong to the Republican (Democratic) Party as an explanation; results are robust to controlling for the fraction of the tercile registered for the legislator's party. However, controlling for the level of support for the bill in the most partisan neighborhoods does eliminate the significant difference in the explanatory power of the lowest and highest income terciles. Republican (Democratic) legislators vote like their high (low) income constituents not because those constituents are high income or even because they are Republicans but because those constituents are partisans, our results suggest. We present our results in detail, after first presenting our data and methodology in the next session.
DATA/METHODLOGY

Sample of Issues
In order to assess the relative degree to which the views of various constituencies are represented by their legislator's voting, we need to know how these constituencies would have voted on the same issues had they been in a position to do so. We turn to the state of California for our analysis because in California the constituents, through ballot propositions, were in such a position. Over the nine two-year legislative sessions that span the years 1991-2008 2 we identify 77 times when the same issue was voted on by both representatives on the floor of the legislature and the public in either a general or primary election. (Sixty-six bills were voted on by both chambers; while eight were voted on by the lower house, the assembly, alone and three were voted on by the upper house, the senate, alone.)
In addition to the abundance of issues for which we have data on both legislative roll call and public votes, there are two additional strengths of our matched data: 1) The number of individual opinions aggregated into district/income cell, is much larger 3 than in a survey and thus the public vote is less prone to classical measurement error and 2) the match between the 2 Our sample period begins with the first congressional session whose electoral data are available in the Statewide Database and ends with the last session available at the time of data collection. 3 Where Erickson and Bhatti (2011) have 150,000 individuals overall and 15,000 in California, we have approximately 150,000 (300,000) individuals 18 and over who cast a ballot on each of our issues in each assembly (senate) district.
legislative vote and the public vote is quite precise (many times worded identically) so the public vote is likely a better measure of the public's desired outcome on the legislative vote than the response to a survey question which is often a very simplified version of a legislative issue.
Our 77 votes can be classified into two matching types: mandatory (56) and nonmandatory (21) matches. Mandatory matches occur when the legal process requires that voters vote on the same issue with the same wording that legislators voted on previously. In order to pass a bond act, to make a change to the constitution or to amend legislation passed in a statewide public referendum, both houses of the legislature must approve the measure by a 2/3 supermajority and the public must pass the measure by a simple majority. The second type of mandatory match happens when voters wish to overturn a law that has been passed by the legislature and signed into law by the governor. They do so by collecting signatures to get the measure placed on the electoral ballot and then having a simple majority vote to overturn. Nonmandatory matches, in contrast, are not stipulated by law. They generally arise because a group works to pass the same legislation through both ballot initiative and through the legislative process, either simultaneously or sequentially. 4 Laws, that do not amend the constitution, can be passed through either public or legislative initiative. We identified these non-mandatory matches by reading through the contents of legislation and ballot initiatives. For more details on how we chose our sample votes, please see the Data Appendix. are not yet electronically available. 5 The 77 votes include a wide range of topics including 4 In many cases a group attempts to pass legislation through the legislative process first and once that attempt fails (due to failure to receive enough votes of the senate or assembly floor or because the legislation dies in committee), the group works to get the legislation on the statewide ballot. 5 We have four and five bills for 2001-2002 and 2003-2004 respectively and 7-14 for each of the other sessions.
courts, education, elections, employment, energy, the environment, health, infrastructure and taxation. For a complete list of bills/initiatives please see the Data Appendix.
One potential criticism of this data source is that it has limited generalizeability. In
California the ballot initiative process is used quite frequently, thus raising the concern that California legislators, facing the threat of being overturned by the public, may be more responsive to public opinion than legislators in other states, particularly legislators in the 25
states that do not allow for public referendum (Bowler and Donovan, 1998) . However, we note that the use of ballot propositions does not incentivize legislators to respond more to one income group over another. Nor do the proposition votes offer additional information on voter views, and certainly not differentially for one income group more than another, as voters cast their ballots a median time of 187 days after their representatives. In both states with and without ballot initiatives, legislators gather information on constituent opinion through direct communication with voters and through their own polling.
One concern given the timing of events is that a member of the public is influenced in how to vote on a proposition by the legislative vote on that issue cast by his/her state representative. If that were the case our measure of public opinion would not be a good proxy for public opinion before the legislative vote occurred. If low and high income voters were differentially influenced by the votes of their representatives, then our measure of the difference between low and high income representation would be biased by the difference in the degree to which these two groups copy the behavior of the representative. However, the idea that constituents vote according to the preferences of their legislators seems unlikely for two reasons. In order to increase the fit of our models and to be able to meaningfully add controls to explore various mechanisms, we recode both legislature and public votes from yes or no to liberal or conservative. We determine whether the yes or no side of each vote is the liberal side by turning to the tract-level returns from the ballot initiative. For each initiative we run the following regression: We know from a myriad of previous work that the views of the legislator and the constituency should be highly correlated.
12 Thus, to verify the validity of both our vote coding (liberal/conservative) and our matching of voters to districts, Table 1 examines the relationship between a legislator's tendency to vote liberally and the liberal views (as measured by their ballot initiative vote) of his/her constituency. Each cell of the table presents the estimated  from a linear probability model of the form:
where Legislator_vote is an indicator for whether the legislator voted liberally (or yes in the uncoded specification) and Constituency_vote is the share of voters in the district who voted on the measure who voted liberally (yes). We construct the Constituency_vote by aggregating voting returns to the assembly/senate district as configured at the time the legislator voted on the measure.
13
The 0.979 in the first column of Table 1 indicates that the likelihood that the legislator votes in favor of the legislation increases nearly one for one with the share of district voters supporting the measure. That relationship is strengthened to 1.7 to 1 when we increase the fit and 11 We classify observations in which legislators abstain as missing. Largely because of abstentions and to a small degree because of vacancies we lose about 10 percent of our target sample of 8680. (80 assembly members *74 votes + 40 senators * 69 votes = 8680). There are 809 abstentions and 58 votes missing due to vacancies. While we find that Democrats are more likely to abstain the more conservative their constituents are on the issue and Republicans are more likely to abstain the more liberal their constituents are on the issue, we find that representatives of both parties are less likely to abstain when there is an above median difference of opinion between low and high income areas in their district. Thus we do not believe that abstentions are systematically biasing our results. 12 For instance Snyder (1996) demonstrates this fact for California state legislators in an earlier time period. 13 Because of redistricting this may differ from the configuration of the districts at the time that the voters voted on the ballot initiative. precision of our model by recoding vote choice as liberal/conservative, the results of column 2 demonstrate. Our coding system is most likely to misclassify those bills that are the least partisan, those for which Democrats and Republicans vote similarly. Thus it is comforting that our results are robust to dropping these more moderate bills, in particular the 13 bills for which
<0.1, as shown in column 3. In terms of issue match, one might be concerned that legislative bills that we hand matched to ballot items are not as close a match in terms of bill content as the mandatory ones. However, we demonstrate in column 4 that these hand matches are not driving our Table 1 findings; results are robust to their exclusion.
14 In pairing legislators with voters one difficulty is redistricting. In what we refer to as redistricting years, legislators have been elected by one group of voters but are seeking reelection from another group. 15 We always match legislators to the district and the voters who elected them. 16 However, legislators may be more interested in aligning their votes with the views of those who will cast ballots on their reelection. Therefore it is interesting to see in column 4 that when we drop these redistricting years, the relationship between legislator and constituency support for the measure strengthens. In the final four columns of the table we show that this relationship between constituent and legislator support holds across parties and chambers. Table 1 demonstrates that constituent views, not surprisingly, are represented in the votes that their legislators cast. Our focus in this paper is on whether the interests of those voters from lower income areas are as well represented as those from higher income areas. To do so we disaggregate Constituency_vote into three variables giving the proportion voting liberally of 14 The hand match sample also shows a positive significant relationship between legislative and constituent support. The coefficient is 1.3. 15 A term in the assembly is two years. Redistricting years for the assembly are 1991-1992 and 2001-2002 . Senators serve for four years, but terms are staggered so half the senate terms expire in presidential years and half in the midterm. So for senators serving in even numbered districts redistricting years are 1991-1994 and 1999-2002 and for senators serving in odd numbered districts redistricting years in our sample are 1991-1992 and 2001-2004 . 16 We match with the current district and not the future district because of the impossibility of knowing what district a legislator would have been assigned to next if s/he does not stand for reelection.
those voting amongst the lowest, middle and highest income terciles in the district. Income terciles are created by interpolating from tract level data on average household income. We weight by share of residents who are citizens aged 18 and over so that each tercile has an equal number of eligible voters, and thus equal electoral power. Given the well established correlation between income and conservatism, 17 it is not surprising that we show in the summary statistics in 
Methodology
In our primary analysis we run linear probability models of the form:
Where Legislator_vote is defined as in equation 2. Constituency_vote_Top is the share of voters in the highest income tracts in the district who voted liberally on the measure and Constituency_vote_Bottom is the same variable calculated for residents of the lowest income tracts in the district. Because of a concern of lack of independence and serial correlation among votes within legislator we cluster the standard errors for all of the votes that a legislator casts within a single chamber. suggests that representation does not vary by income. We note that we only capture the views of the members of the tercile who actually cast a ballot. Just as with survey data, to the extent that 19 We have also created terciles based on race that we are using in a companion project on how representation varies with legislator and constituent neighborhood race. 20 Results are robust to probit specifications and to using splines of the constituent voting measures.
the views of nonparticipants differ from political participants, our results only speak to the differential representation of political participants.
In our basic specification we do not include In Figure 1 we examine the robustness of our contrasting finding across parties. The Republican sample is smaller. Republicans are a minority in both chambers in every session in our sample period. In addition to being a minority in the legislature, Republicans are a minority amongst the populous. It's not surprising that it is harder to predict the voting behavior of Republican legislators, who face a tension between party and popular wishes.
In the second column of the figure we begin the robustness checks. In this column we control for the middle income tercile, which for both Democratic and Republican districts includes the median voter based on income. Our basic results are robust to the inclusion of the middle tercile. (Please see Appendix Table 1 for the coefficients on low and high income terciles for the specifications in Figure 1 .) In the next two columns of the figure we ensure that our coding is not driving our findings. Results are robust both to excluding those less partisan votes that are more likely to be misclassified in our liberal/conservative vote classification system as well as to leaving the legislator and public votes uncoded in their original yes/no to the proposition form.
24
In the next two columns of the figure we examine robustness to different measures of income. One concern with mean income as a measure of economic well being is that income may be mechanically increasing in family size. In the fifth column of the figure we demonstrate that our results are robust to terciles based on within district poverty, a measure that does take family size into account. For this specification we subtract the coefficient for top poverty tercile 24 Results are also robust to limiting the sample to legislative votes taken during non redistricting years.
from the coefficient for bottom poverty tercile, so that the sign of the results is comparable to the income terciles.
A second concern about our income terciles is that the low income voters in one district may be lower or higher income than the low income voters in another district. To make sure that incomparable income terciles are not driving our findings, in the next column of the figure "State Income" we create terciles based on state income. The cut offs for low and high income are the same across all districts for these terciles. Of course the number of voters per tercile now varies within district so we control for the share of the district population in each tercile. Results are robust to both the poverty and state income measures.
In order to interpret D ˆ as the relative difference in representation of the top and bottom tercile, we assume that our constituent view variables represent the views of the constituents at the time of the legislative vote and that those views are not influenced by the voting behavior of the legislator. As we laid out in the data section, we assume this primarily because of the low level of knowledge that voters have of politician behavior, particularly state politician behavior.
And to the degree that voters have political knowledge that knowledge is increasing in income which could explain our results for Republican legislators but not for the Democrats. In the next two columns of Figure 1 we present an additional test of our assumption. We divide the sample into issues that the public voted on during primary elections, when a small dedicated and politically knowledgeable electorate turns out and general elections, when a greater cross section of voters comes to the polls. Cooperative Congressional Election Studies which asked respondents how they felt about 13 high profile votes in the current congressional sessions. 25 We use these data to ask whether United States senators' voting is better explained by their lower or higher income constituents.
26
In these national data we see once again that the opinions of high and low income voters are correlated, although not as highly as in California state legislative districts, 27 and we see again that the answer to the question of relative representation depends on the party of the legislator.
Democratic senators' voting is better explained by the views of their low income constituents;
for Republican senators the reverse is true. However, we caution that the finding is merely suggestive given the limited number of issues and much smaller sample size. 28 In fact, the 25 The votes concern stem cell research (both 2006 and 2008) Returning to our California data, we next examine whether the pattern of our results is robust to the key issue that pits the rich against the poor: taxation. We define tax bills in two ways. First in our more subjective coding, we identify, based on our reading of the legislation, six bills whose primary focus is on tax policy or bond issuance. 30 A good example of such a bill is AB83 in 1998 which proposed a change to the top marginal income tax bracket and a change to state and local tax revenue sharing. (For more details on our coding please see the Data
Appendix.) Our second more expansive, and more objective coding measure categorizes issues as tax or non-tax based simply on whether the word "tax" or "bond" appears in the text of the final bill in a manner that indicates the bill concerns taxation. 31 We identify 38 tax issues in this fashion. A good example of bills that fall into the second category, but not the first would be our three education bond acts. Although the subjective results are much less precisely estimated due to the small sample size, we demonstrate in the first two columns of Figure 2 , that our results are robust to either definition of tax legislation. And in fact we see in the third column of the figure that by the objective coding the tax results are statically indistinguishable from the non-tax results. In the fourth column of the figure we define bills on which low and high income voters 29 The liberal/conservative model simply does not fit as well in an Rsq sense. Across these votes it is easier to predict agree than vote ideology within party 30 In fact we divide the 77 bills into 14 issue categories. Seven of these categories have enough variation in legislator voting within both parties to estimate models of the form of equation 3. Of those 7, we find that the Republican results are robust to six and the Democratic results robust to 4. Thus the Democratic results, while robust across votes and within taxation, appear to be less robust as we take different cuts of the data. Unfortunately there are not enough votes per category to state this conclusively. However, the California legislature and population are likely to continue voting on the same issues. Thus the robustness of the results to bills from various issue areas is a subject for future research. 31 For example we omit SCA 18 in the 1995-96 session because although the assembly floor analysis refers to "bond acts and other ballot measures," this is the only mention of taxation in the bill. Results are also robust to bills which are higher stakes for the legislator. We define higher stakes in four ways: 1) An election year for the legislator's seat when the legislator has not reached the term limit; 2) Not having hit the term limit; 3) Representing a district in which the legislator's party does not comprise a majority of voters and 4) Close vote-those for which the outcome would change if one legislator changed his/her vote. Results are robust across those four definitions. However given the fact that only 9 of 77 votes are defined as close and that closeness should properly be measured ex-ante, we put the least stock in the noisily estimated close results. Nonetheless the results of Figure 2 taken as a whole demonstrate that the Democratic legislature/low income voter correspondence and the Republican legislature/high income voter correspondence is robust to issues for which there is class tension and to votes which are higher stakes for the legislator. (Please see Appendix Table 2 for the coefficients on low and high income for these specifications.)
What is the mechanism by which this correspondence arises? That is the question we explore in the remainder of the paper. Levitt (2003) showed that nearly half of the weight in a legislator's decision function is placed on his/her own ideology, as modeled by a legislator fixed effect. Thus one possibility is that Republican (Democratic) legislator's voting is better explained by voters from high (low) income areas because these legislator's views happen to be more in line with voters from these particular areas. We test for this possibility by adding legislator (within chamber) fixed effects to our basic model. The basic results are robust to this addition, we show in the second column of Figure 3 . Even conditional on their own views,
Republican legislators' voting is better explained by the views of high income voters and for
Democratic legislators the reverse also remains true. (Please see Appendix Table 3 for coefficients for the specifications shown in Figure 3 .) In fact for Democrats D ˆ is slightly increased by the addition of the fixed effects.
One concern about the legislator fixed effects specification is that legislators may have different mean voting patterns for different issues. For example a legislator might be conservative on fiscal issues, but liberal on moral issues. If this were the case then a single fixed effect, while a good measure of voting on average, would be a poor measure of average voting on some issues. In the third column of the figure we limit the focus to the key issue, taxation (objective coding), which puts low and high income voters at odds. Our basic pattern is robust to including legislator fixed effects to control for the legislator's propensity to vote liberally on this single issue. 32 Thus even in explaining voting behavior within legislator and within issue, higher income voters play a larger role if that legislator is a Republican and lower income voters' views play a larger role if that legislator is a Democrat.
33
The next possible mechanism we investigate is income differences in the nature of the voters' views themselves; in particular intensity and homogeneity of views may play a role. For instance, it is possible that voters in high income neighborhoods within Republican districts feel more strongly about the issue than do low income voters. We investigate this possibility by proxying opinion intensity by turnout; we add to the basic model the share of the first and third 32 The pattern of results is also robust to the much smaller sample in the subjectively coded tax measure. However, the Republican D ˆ is not statistically significant in that subjective tax, legislator fixed effects specification. 33 The within legislator models are an interesting contrast to the within bill models for which the explanatory power of the two groups is statistically indistinguishable, as we have seen in previous cross sectional literature and we see in our current analysis when we include bill fixed effects. The bill fixed effects implicitly control for the within party mean legislative vote on each issue. (In fact controlling for the mean vote of other legislators in the party on the issue produces nearly identical results.) The bill fixed effect models suggest that the legislators of the same party coordinate on a vote for a particular issue, but do not provide intuition as to why they do so.
income terciles who voted on the issue. Because proposition turnout is increasing in income, these controls yield a likely explanation only for the Republican legislator findings. However, we see in the fourth column of the figure that for both Republican and Democratic legislators the addition of the turnout control does not serve to alter the basic result. (For this column and for the remainder of columns in this figure results are robust to a focus on only objective tax issues.)
Homogeneity of voter views is another possible explanation. Gerber and Lewis (2004) show that legislators place less weight on voters' views when those views are more heterogeneous. We model heterogeneity by calculating the standard deviation of voter opinion across tracts within terciles and adding this measure for the first and third terciles to our basic model. However, heterogeneity proves not to be the mechanism for our findings, as our basic result is robust to this addition. See the fifth column of Figure 3 for these results.
We move now from a more narrow focus on voter views on the focal issues to investigate whether participation and political views more generally can explain why Republican legislators vote more in line with the views of voters from higher income neighborhoods and Democratic legislators vote the will of voters from lower income neighborhoods. Greater political participation may mean that the voters have a greater opportunity to select a representative who is like minded; it may mean that the legislator is more aware of the group's policy desires; or it may mean that the group is more likely to punish the politician for deviations from those desires.
Griffan and Newman (2005) provide evidence that in the US Senate the views of voters are significantly better represented the views of non-voters. We measure participation in two ways:
1) Turnout for the highest office in the most recent general election and 2) Share registered. 34 We calculate each of these measures for the first and third income terciles and add them to the basic model in specifications 6 and 7 of Figure 3 . To these specifications we also add year fixed effects to control for year to year swings in interest in elections. Once again, we note that because participation is increasing in income it is only a likely explanation for the Republican legislator findings. But as the results of Figure 3 show, controlling for participation differences between top and bottom income terciles does not alter our findings. The robustness to the inclusion of participation controls is further evidence that our findings are not driven by an influence of legislative voting on constituent views. Those who participate most are likely to be the most knowledgeable so if their acting on this knowledge were driving results, the results should be attenuated by the participation control.
Finally, we investigate party as a mechanism. We control for the share of registrants in group patterns hold within legislator, for those votes which place high and low income voters at odds and for those votes for which there is more at stake for the elected official.
As for mechanisms, the differential income representation of both parties is explained away by the correlation between the views of the constituents of the top income and top
Republican constituent terciles and between the bottom income and top Democratic constituent terciles. Democratic and Republican legislators better represent different income groups not because those voters are high or low income but because those constituents are highly partisan.
We do caution that our work focuses on just one type of representation: voting.
Legislators also introduce issues to the floor, bring money to their districts and perform public services for their constituents. Whether or not constituent income predicts performance on these issues remains a question for future research.
37 37 In fact one of the authors is currently exploring this question with respect to the distribution of public goods within a city council district. 2 We do not have data on special elections. Thus the legislative election data is always drawn from the most recent general election. Under 4 percent of the legislative votes are cast by a member elected in a special election. 
